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I. INTRODUCTION
Public land law' has only recently emerged as a distinct area of law.2
The scholars and practitioners who have undertaken the task of exploring
and describing the major contours of this new legal domain have found that
while public land law is a new field, it has roots that run deep through our
nation's history and its legal tradition. Given the precedential nature of our
legal system, it can be anticipated that as the courts are presented with
public land law issues of first impression they will look to this past to inform
their decisions. Likewise, it can be expected that in deciding such issues the
courts will search the contemporary legal landscape in an attempt to
integrate this new area of law into the overarching scheme of American
jurisprudence.
Against such a backdrop, this article is concerned with examining a
public land law issue of first impression. The particular issue involved is the
constitutionality of section 204(e) of the Federal Land Management and
Policy Act of 1976 (FLPMA), whereby a single committee of either house
of Congress can withdraw public lands from mineral leasing by the
Secretary of Interior.3 This provision has been relied on in recent years to
thwart several controversial attempts by the Secretary to lease public lands
in Montana. 4 In two resulting lawsuits 5 the Secretary charged that these
1. As used in this article the term "public land law" refers to the statutes governing the public
lands, as well as the judicial construction of these laws.
2. See Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future
Directions, I PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 6 (1980) (footnote omitted):
Historically, it could be said that there was no defined body of "public land law." Separate
attention was focused on the discrete bodies of law that had developed around the specific
"economic" resources on the public lands-water, hardrock minerals, fuel minerals, forage,
and timber. Today, public land law is a coalescing body of law, rather than a loosely
connected series of laws dealing with separate resources. Today, for the first time, public
land law is truly a field.
3. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982) provides in relevant part:
When the Secretary determines, or when the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of
either the House of Representatives or the Senate [Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources] notifies the Secretary, that an emergency situation exists and that
extraordinary measures must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost, the
Secretary notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (c)(l) and (d) of this section, shall
immediately make a withdrawal ....
4. On May 21, 1981 the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs adopted a resolution
directing the Secretary of Interior to immediately withdraw from mineral leasing the public lands
encompassed by the Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex in northwest Montana. On August 3, 1983 the
same committee ordered the Secretary to withdraw from coal leasing the Fort Union tracts located in
eastern Montana and western North Dakota.
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actions amounted to legislative vetoes which were violative of the strictures
for congressional action set forth in article I of the United States
Constitution, as recently construed by the United States Supreme Court in
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.6 While in both cases
the federal district courts upheld the committee action on technical
grounds, the underlying constitutional issue remains unresolved. In its
simplest form, that issue is whether Congress possesses a power under the
property clause of article IV to perform an act, the legislative veto, which
has otherwise been declared violative of the requirements of article I.
Given the profound cleavage that continues to exist between the
executive branch and the House of Representatives on resource issues, it is
probable that this controversy will yet be resolved by the courts.7 This
article explores whether there is a viable argument to support the
exemption of the legislative veto provision contained in section 204(e) of
FLPMA from the strictures for legislation set forth in Chadha.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FLPMA and the Assertion of Congressional Power Over the
Public Lands
The United States owns 740 million acres of land or roughly one-third
of the nation's land mass.8 Of this amount, almost 700 million acres9 are
statutorily regulated by Congress under the property clause of the United
States Constitution.10 Considered vague in origin and perplexing in its
location within the Constitution, 1 the property clause has evolved through
5. See Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1982) (involving the Bob
Marshall Wilderness Complex in western Montana); and National Wildlife Federation v. Watt, 571 F.
Supp. 1145 (D. D.C. 1983) (involving the Fort Union coal tracts in eastern Montana and western
North Dakota).
6. 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), affg Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d
408 (9th Cir. 1980). Since Pacific Legal Foundation was decided before the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Chadha, in Pacific Legal Foundation the Secretary relied on the Ninth Circuit
opinion in Chadha.
7. By returning President Reagan to the White House, while retaining a Democratic majority in
the House of Representatives, the American electorate has set the stage for renewed controversy in this
area.
8. UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S
LAND 19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as PLLRC].
9. The remaining 40 million acres are regulated by Congress under the enclave clause, U.S.
CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17. See infra, note 97. See also D. COGGINS AND C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 146 (1981).
10. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2: "Congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and other Property belonging to the United
States .... "
I1. The other enumerated powers of Congress are located in Article I of the Constitution.
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a series of United States Supreme Court opinions into a plenary source of
congressional power over these lands.12 The watershed opinion in this
process was issued in 1976 by the Supreme Court in Kleppe v. New
Mexico,' 8 which both definitively marked the emergence of this clause as a
preemptive legislative power over the public domain,' 4 as well as indicated
that the process of defining the bounds of Congress' power under the
property clause was not yet complete:
[T]he Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to
determine what are "needful" rules "respecting" the public
lands. And while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the
Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have
repeatedly observed that "[t]he power over the public land thus
entrusted to Congress is without limitations."' 5
Pursuant to this power, Congress in the last decade thoroughly
revamped the statutory framework governing the public lands.' 6 The
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976' 7 stands as the
cornerstone to the contemporary congressional scheme for regulating the
use of these lands. In FLPMA, Congress fundamentally restructured both
the policy of the federal government toward the public lands and the
system of delegated authority under which the executive branch imple-
mented public land policy. Rejecting the long-standing policy favoring
disposal of these lands,' 8 Congress enunciated a new policy of retention' 9
for multiple use and sustained-yield.20 And in contrast to the former
statutory framework which was characterized by broad delegations of
authority,2' FLPMA contained specific guidelines governing executive
Regarding historical materials, one respected commentator has concluded that the "debates at the
Constitutional Convention and other early interpretations are not especially illuminating." Wilkinson,
supra note 2, at 10. But cf. infra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); Utah Power and Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
13. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
14. Id. at 543.
15. Id. at 539.
16. See Resources Planning Act of 1974 and National Forest Management Act of 1976, both 16
U.S.C. §§ 1601-13 (1982); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84
(1982).
17. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1982).
18. See generally COGGINS AND WILKINSON, supra note 9, at 43-119.
19. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4) (1982).
20. 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982).
21. See, e.g., the Withdrawal [Pickett] Act of 1910, which provided that:
The President may at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from settlement,
location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States, including the District of
Alaska and reserve the same for water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other
public purpose to be specified in the orders of withdrawals, and such withdrawals or
reservations shall remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress.
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed by Pub. L. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat.
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withdrawals of public lands from private use."
The withdrawal provisions of FLPMA are of particular significance,
since the executive branch had traditionally relied on both an implied
delegation of withdrawal power from Congress2 3 as well as the claim of an
inherent authority of the President to make withdrawals.24 In section
704(a), however, Congress expressly revoked the implied authority of the
executive to make withdrawals. 25 And in section 102(a) Congress unequiv-
ocally rejected the notion of an inherent executive power to make
withdrawals, stating that it is the policy of the United States that "the
Congress exercise its constitutional authority to withdraw or otherwise
designate or dedicate Federal lands for specified purposes and that
Congress delineate the extent to which the Executive may withdraw lands
without legislative action. '"26
Moreover, to insure executive compliance with the statutory guide-
lines for withdrawals, Congress retained in section 204(c) of FLPMA a
legislative veto power over Executive branch withdrawals in excess of
5,000 acres,27 and in section 204(e) Congress retained the power to order
the Secretary of Interior to withdraw lands when the relevant committee of
either the House or Senate determined that an emergency threatened such
lands.2"
2792, 43 U.S.C. § 1774(a) (1982).
22. See 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1982). FLPMA defined withdrawals as follows:
The term "withdrawal" means withholding an area of Federal land from settlement, sale,
location or entry, under some or all of the general land laws, for the purpose of limiting
activities under those laws in order to maintain other public values in the area or reserving
the area for a particular public purpose or program ....
43 U.S.C. § 1702(d) (1982).
23. In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,475 (1915), the Supreme Court affirmed
the executive withdrawals of public lands containing petroleum deposits on the basis of an implied
delegation of authority flowing from acquiescence in a long established executive practice:
These orders were known to Congress, as principal, and in not a single instance was the act of
the agent disapproved. Its acquiescence all the more readily operated as an implied grant of
power in view of the fact that its exercise was not only useful to the public but did not
interfere with any vested right of the citizen.
24. In 1941 Attorney General Jackson issued an opinion affirming the inherent power of the
executive to make permanent withdrawals of public lands. See 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 73 (1941). This
opinion was subsequently relied on by the Secretary of Interior in making large-scale withdrawals
without congressional authorization. See Wheatley, Withdrawals Under the Federal Land Policy
Management Act of 1976, 21 ARz. L. REv. 311, 316-17 (1979).
25. Pub. L. No. 94-579,90 Stat. 2743,2792 (1976) provides in relevant part: "Effective on and
after the date of approval of this Act, the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and
reservations resulting from acquiescence of the Congress and the following statutes and parts of
statutes are repealed ...." This section went on to repeal twenty-nine withdrawal statutes passed
between 1888 and 1952, including the Pickett Act of 1910.
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4) (1982).
27. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c) (1982).
28. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982).
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Although President Ford acquiesced in signing FLPMA into law,29
the executive branch has consistently resisted as unconstitutional such
reservations of congressional power as contained in section 204.30 Indeed,
the constitutionality of these control mechanisms has been cast into doubt
by the recent Supreme Court decision in Chadha. The Chadha Court held
that the legislative veto exercised by one house of congress pursuant to a
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)"1 was a legisla-
tive act,3 2 thus violating the requirements in article I of the United States
Constitution that legislation be enacted by both houses of Congress3 3 and
then presented to the President for signature or veto.3 4 Before examining
the implications of this decision on section 204(e) of FLPMA, the
legislative veto mechanism and the Chadha decision are examined in more
detail.
B. The Legislative Veto
The legislative veto first appeared in 1932 in legislation authorizing
President Hoover to reorganize the executive agencies by executive order
subject to congressional disapproval prior to the effective date of the
order.3 5 From this origin the legislative veto has grown to become a
formidable component of modern legislation. 6 The laws containing a
legislative veto provision have come to address a variety of national
problems, ranging from foreign relations to the management of the public
lands.37 The geometric proportions of this trend have been revealed by a
survey of its use:
Since 1932, when the first veto provision was enacted into law,
295 congressional veto-type procedures have been inserted in 196
different statutes as follows: from 1932 to 1939, five statutes were
affected; from 1940-49, nineteen statutes; between 1950-59
thirty-four statutes; and from 1960-69, forty-nine. From the year
29. See Department of Interior comments to Hon. James A. Haley, Chairman, Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs (November 25, 1975). H.R. Rep. No. 94-1163,94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 47,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6221.
30. See Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS.
735, 737-38 n.7 (1979) (listing presidential statements in opposition to the legislative veto).
31. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982).
32. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
33. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3.
35. Act of June 30,1932, ch. 314 § 407,47 Stat. 414. For more on early uses of the legislative veto
see Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L.
REv. 253, 258-59 (1982).
36. See Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive En-
croachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977).
37. See Appendix I attached by Justice White to his dissenting opinion in Chadha where the
legislative veto provisions contained in sections 203 and 204 of FLPMA are cited. 103 S. Ct. at 2816.
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1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such
provisions were included in eighty-nine laws.38
This trend had a decided effect on the Supreme Court's scrutiny of the
legislative veto in Chadha: "[O]ur inquiry is sharpened rather than
blunted by the fact that Congressional veto provisions are appearing with
increasing frequency in statutes which delegate authority to executive and
independent agencies .... 39
Several twentieth century political developments have been credited
with creating the impetus for Congress to develop this mechanism. One
significant development is the increased power of the presidency as an
institution.4 0 Beginning with Woodrow Wilson, taking an exponential leap
with Franklin Roosevelt and continuing in successive administrations, this
process has focused enormous powers in the executive branch which were
formerly diffused among the several branches of government.41 The
increasing complexity of the issues facing our government has fueled this
process, as Congress has found it necessary to delegate extensive decision-
making authority to the executive branch in order to implement broadly
conceived legislative policies. 2
In the public land law area during the last decade, however, Congress
has enacted legislation, including FLPMA, which is characterized by a
different theme: "[The] central thrust is not to delegate broad authority to
land management agencies but rather to limit administrative discretion by
requiring public participation and establishing prohibited acts."4 a Despite
the differences in the scope of the delegated authority, in both instances
Congress has attempted to retain increased control over the administrative
agencies' exercise of this authority by retaining a veto power over agency
decisions.4 4 In Chadha, however, the Supreme Court stood this scheme on
its head by declaring that the legislative veto provision in the INA violated
the basic constitutional principle of separation of powers.
38. See Abourezk, supra note 36, at 324 (quoted in Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781).
39. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
40. See Miller and Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework,
52 IND. L.J. 367, 375-77 (1977), for a list of factors including the increased power of the President.
41. That the founding fathers were themselves aware of this possibility is hauntingly illustrated
by the following quote from Thomas Jefferson: "The tyranny of legislatures is the most formidable
dread at present, and will be for many years. That of the executive will come in its turn; but it will be at
some remote period." Jefferson Works, Vol. 11, 358. Quoted in Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, II IND. L.J. 309, 317 (1936).
42. See generally, Abourezk, supra note 36.
43. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 6.
44. For a list of public land laws containing legislative vetoes see Backiel and Baldwin, Who
Controls the Federal Lands After Chadha?, in Cong. Research Serv. Rev., The Legislative Veto After
INS v. Chadha (special ed. 1983).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2788.
1985]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
C. The Chadha Decision
1. Facts
Jagdish Rai Chadha is an East Indian who came to the United States
on a nonimmigrant student visa in 1966.46 He overstayed his visa and was
ordered by the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) to show cause
why he should not be deported under the provisions of the INA17 In
response to this order Chadha applied for suspension of his deportation
under section 244(a) of the INA.4s After a hearing, the immigration judge
found that Chadha met the standards of the INA which allowed for a
suspension of deportation, including the criterion that deportation would
cause extreme hardship. 9
The House of Representatives, however, acting under a legislative
veto provision contained in section 244(c) of the INA, overruled this
administrative determination." Consequently, the INS ordered Chadha
deported. Chadha filed a petition for review of the deportation order in the
Ninth Circuit, arguing that the legislative veto used to overrule the agency
determination was unconstitutional. The INS joined Chadha in his
argument, forcing the Senate and the House to file briefs in support of the
veto provision. The Ninth Circuit held that the legislative veto exercised by
the House to effectuate Chadha's deportation was unconstitutional and it
ordered the INS to cease its deportation proceedings against him.5 1 The
INS then applied for and received a writ of certiorari from the Supreme
Court to review the case on its merits. 2
2. The Supreme Court's Reasoning
Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion for a six-justice majority of the
Court.53 After disposing of a "political question doctrine" defense raised
46. Id. at 2770.
47. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1982).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982).
49. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
50. Id. at 2771.
51. Id. at 2772. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit issued a narrowly reasoned opinion in which the
court of appeals reserved judgment as to the constitutionality of similar provisions in other statutes:
"Such factors might present considerations different from those we find here, both as to the question of
separation of powers and the legitimacy of the unicameral device." Chadha v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408, 433 (9th Cir. 1980).
52. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. at 2771.
53. Justice Powell concurred, but in contrast to the majority he believed that Congress acted
judicially rather than legislatively when it determined that Chadha did not comply with the statutory
criteria of the INA. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2791. Justice Rehnquist dissented on the basis that the
legislative veto provision was inseverable from the provision of the INA delegating authority allowing
the INS to suspend the deportation of Chadha in the first place. Id. at 2816. Justice White alone
[Vol. 6
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by Congress,"" the Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the
legislative veto on its merits. Although the Court acknowledged the
prevalence of this legislative mechanism and admitted that it might in fact
be a useful political invention, the Court nevertheless stated that such
considerations would not exempt it from the requirements set forth in the
Constitution. 55
Noting that the Constitution explicitly defines the respective func-
tions of the Congress and the Executive in the legislative process, the Court
set out verbatim the bicameral and presentment clauses of Article L" The
Court noted that these clauses were integral parts of the constitutional
design for the separation of powers, and relying on the 1976 Supreme
Court case of Buckley v. Valeo,57 the Court served notice that it would use
what amounted to a strict interpretivist approach when construing the
implications of these clauses in preserving this constitutional design.58
Relying on this approach, the Chadha Court surmised that the
requirements of the presentment clauses were intended by the framers to
dissented on the merits of the constitutional issue, reasoning that if "Congress may delegate lawmaking
power to independent and executive agencies, it is most difficult to understand Article I as forbidding
Congress from also reserving a check on legislative power for itself." Id. at 2802.
54. Congress argued that the naturalization clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the
necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, combined to give Congress unreviewable
authority over the regulation of aliens, rendering Chadha's appeal nonjusticiable. After reviewing the
traditional criteria set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the Court concluded that the
constitutionality of the legislative veto was justiciable. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2778-80. For further
discussion of the relevance of the political question doctrine to the resolution of the controversy
concerning § 204(e) of FLPMA, see infra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
55. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
56. Id. at 2781 (emphasis added by the Court):
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate anda House of Representatives. Art. I, § I (emphasis added).
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives andthe Senate, shall,
before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; Art. I, § 7, ch. 2
(emphasis added).
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary... shall he presented to the President of the United
States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being
disapproved by him, shall he repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives .... Art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
57. 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976). In Valeo the Supreme Court declared that a provision of the Federal
Elections Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1970, Supp. IV), which allowed Congress to appoint
members to the Federal Election Commission violated constitutional provisions for the separation of
powers. Id. at 136. In reaching this conclusion the Valeo Court relied extensively on the FEDERALIST
PAPERS (H. Lodgeed.) (1888), as well as M. Farrand, THE RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 (19 11) to construe the framers' intent vis-a-vis the separation of powers outlined in the
Constitution.
58. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781. Interpretivism has been defined as a system of constitutional
analysis wherein judges should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implied
in either the written Constitution or its legislative history. See J. Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 1-42
(1980).
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establish a check upon the legislative body which would both enable the
President to defend himself from encroachments by Congress, as well as
decrease the possibility of bad laws coming into effect through the
indiscretion of Congress. 59 The Court likewise determined that the
bicameral clause was intended to discourage Congress from passing ill-
conceived laws, while at the same time diffusing the power which the
framers considered to be the most susceptible to abuse.60 On the basis of
this analysis of the framers' intent in drafting the presentment and
bicameral clauses, the Chadha Court concluded that "[i]t emerges clearly
that the prescription for legislative action in article I, §§ 1,7 represents the
framers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively consid-
ered procedure." 61
Having enunciated the constitutional requirements demanded of
legislation, the Court had only to determine if the legislative veto was a
legislative act. The Court stated that such a determination was not
dependent on the form of an action, but rather on its character and effect.62
On this basis the Court concluded that the exercise of the legislative veto
against Chadha was essentially a legislative act because it "had the
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of
persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and
Chadha, all outside the legislative branch."6 3 Since this legislative act did
not meet the bicameral and presentment requirements prescribed by
article I, the Court declared it unconstitutional.64
3. Critique
Virtually all of the legislative veto provisions, contained in nearly 200
statutes, have "the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and
relations of persons... outside of the legislative branch. '6 5 By adopting this
test for determining what constitutes legislation, the Supreme Court in
Chadha rendered a decision with broad implications. Since legislative veto
provisions by their very nature do not comply with the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered procedure" required of legislation,
59. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2782. In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS, No. 73 at 457-58, and 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 57, at 301-02.
60. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2783, relying on M. FARRAND, supra note 57, at 254, and THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 22 at 135, No. 51 at 324.
61. 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2788.
65. Justice White was quick to point out this implication in his dissent in Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at
2792. See also Abourzek, supra note 36, at 323, 324.
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namely bicameral passage and presentment, all are susceptible to constitu-
tional challenge.66
Despite the contentions of the Chadha Court, it is not at all clear that
such a result is firmly premised on the intent of the framers. The framers
themselves rejected an explicit approach to the separation of powers by
discarding a proposal that the three departments "shall be distinct, and
independent of each other except in specified cases."'6 7 Instead, the framers
opted for a separation of the coordinate branches that was implicit in the
final document.
Further, although the writings of Madison were heavily relied upon by
the Chadha Court in support of its strict construction of the separation of
powers doctrine, historical records show that Madison himself held a much
more circumspect view. Madison stated that the doctrine flowed from the
recognition that "where the whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the
fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."68 He further
explained that this did not mean "that these departments ought to have no
partial agency in, or control over, the acts of each other."69
Consistent with this conception of the Constitution, which contem-
plated an overlapping of the powers exercised by the coordinate branches
of government, the dominant focus of analysis by the Supreme Court in
separation of power disputes has usually been on the extent to which a
particular action by one branch of government undermined the indepen-
dence and integrity of another branch.70 This approach established
cooperation between the coordinate branches as the norm, while judicial
66. The Supreme Court confirmed the far-reaching implications of the Chadha decision when
two weeks later it affirmed the judgments rendered by the District of Columbia Circuit in Consumer
Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
affd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), and Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 691 F.2d
575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aft'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). Although there were significant factual differences
between these cases and Chadha, the court of appeals had employed reasoning very similar to that used
by the Supreme Court in Chadha. In Consumer Energy Comm'n the court had declared unconstitu-
tional a two House veto, whereas in Chadha a one House veto was at issue; and both Consumer Energy
Comm'n and Consumer Union involved legislative vetoes of agency rules as opposed to the agency
adjudicatory order at issue in Chadha. By summarily affirming these judgments the Supreme Court
confirmed the breadth of the Chadha decision.
67. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 57, at 138. Likewise, attempts to include an explicit separation of
powers clause in the Bill of Rights was rejected. See Fisher, The Efficiency Side ofSeparated Powers, 5
J. AM. STUD. 113, 130 (1971). Both cited in Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers
Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 715,720-23 (1984). The Banks article more thoroughly develops
the argument based on the framers' intent set forth below.
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
69. Id. at 301-02. In making these statements, Madison was relying on the theory of
Montesquieu to rebut charges that the proposed Constitution was deficient by virtue of not having
incorporated a strict separation of powers doctrine.
70. See, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227-31 (1978).
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resolution of such conflicts based on a simplistic textual approach stand out
as the exception."1 Although earlier Burger Court opinions foreshadowed
the approach taken in Chadha,72 the Chadha rationale is noteworthy for its
total abandonment of the Court's earlier functional analysis.
As one commentator has noted, the Chadha Court's rationale took the
form of a simple syllogism, structured in the following manner:
major premise: when Congress engages in "lawmaking" it may
do so only in accordance with the procedural requirements of
article I;
minor premise: exercise of the legislative veto was "lawmak-
ing" that did not comply with article I;
conclusion: exercise of the legislative veto was
unconstitutional . 73
The minor premise is nothing more than a tautology circling back to the
major premise.74 Given the framers' intent discussed above, it is questiona-
ble that the legislative veto is lawmaking. Nevertheless, given the Court's
rationale, the decision stands as an imminent threat to all legislative veto
provisions.
The task at hand, however, is not to sound the "death knoll" for all
such statutes. 75 Rather, this article is concerned with determining whether
there is a viable argument that can be advanced in favor of exempting a
particular legislative veto provision contained in legislation passed by
Congress pursuant to the property clause of article IV from the article I
rigors set forth in Chadha. While this issue has yet to face appellate review,
two federal district courts have addressed the issue.
71. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (where the Court relied on the
appointments clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, to find an unlimited removal power vested in the
executive as an incident of the power of appointment); Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952) (where the Court declared that an executive order made without congressional
authorization was an act of lawmaking, thus violating the separation doctrine).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (finding no executive privilege to
shield the presidential documents at issue from congressional investigators although acknowledging
such a privilege could protect other presidential material); Buckley v. Veleo, 424 U.S. I (1976) (relying
on the appointments clause to declare unconstitutional a congressional attempt to appoint some
members of the Federal Election Commission, although acknowledging that there was no "hermetic
sealing off" of the three branches).
73. Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A Speculation, 35 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 749, 752 (1984).
74. See Banks, supra note 67, at 725: "The Court's textual argument is weak and tautologi-
cal-the majority concluded that the legislative veto is article I 'legislation,' and thus subject to article I
strictures, by simply declaring that the veto is 'essentially legislative in character and effect.'"
75. Justice White has already done this in his dissent in Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2792.
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D. Initial Cases Construing Section 204(e) of FLPMA
In Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt (PLF), 8 the plaintiffs were oil
and gas lease applicants who brought suit against the Secretary of Interior
after the Secretary reluctantly complied with a withdrawal resolution
adopted by the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Acting
under the authority of section 204(e) of FLPMA, the committee directed
the Secretary to withdraw the public lands within the Bob Marshall
Wilderness complex in northwestern Montana from the operation of
mineral leasing laws until January 1, 1984.1
While the PLF case arose prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Chadha, the PLF court distinguished the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Chadha on the basis of a strained interpretation of section 204(e).
Proceeding on the erroneous premise that "FLPMA continued the
traditional law' 78 respecting withdrawals, the court construed section
204(e) as delegating to the Secretary the power to determine the scope and
duration of any withdrawal requested by Congress.7 1 On this basis the
court determined that the mechanism was sufficiently similar to traditional
congressional committee powers to pass constitutional muster.80
Even assuming arguendo that the PLF court's statutory construction
was otherwise correct, however, the court's reasoning would still not
withstand the test for legislation established by the Supreme Court in
Chadha. Clearly, the committee action in this instance affected the legal
rights and duties of individuals outside of Congress, and therefore,
according to Chadha, it was a legislative act requiring adherence to the
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. Although
in dictum the PLF court summarily declared that Congress' power under
the article IV property clause was subject to the article I requirements for
legislation, 8' the issue of whether the property clause provided grounds to
76. 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1982); clarified, 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mont. 1982). For a more
thorough analysis of this case, see Zafferano, Legal and Policy Implications of Pacific Legal
Foundation v. James Watt, 3 PUB. LAND L. REv. 51 (1982).
77. Pacific Legal Foundation, 529 F. Supp. at 984-85. The Bob Marshall Wilderness Complex
includes the Bob Marshall, Great Bear and Scapegoat Wilderness Areas all of which were created
pursuant to the National Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1976). The Wilderness Act
provided that mineral exploration and leasing would be allowed to continue in wilderness areas until
midnight December 31, 1983.16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1976). Hence, the committee action effectively
precluded any further exploration or leasing activity in those areas. See Pacific Legal Foundation, 529
F. Supp. at 985.
78. Pacific Legal Foundation, 529 F. Supp. at 999. As previously discussed at supra notes 8-34
and accompanying text, precisely the opposite was the case. In section 704(a) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §
1764(a) (1982), Congress explicitly revoked any implied executive authority to make withdrawals as
well as repealed most former statutory delegations of authority to the executive to make withdrawals.
79. Pacific Legal Foundation, 529 F. Supp. at 1000.
80. Id. at 1000, 1005.
81. Id. at 1003.
19851
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
an exception to Chadha remained open.
In National Wildlife Federation v. Watt (NWF) 2 the legality of a
withdrawal resolution of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs made pursuant to section 204(e) of FLPMA was again at issue. In
NWF the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Secretary of Interior from issuing
coal leases in the Fort Union tracts in eastern Montana and western North
Dakota after the Secretary announced his plans to proceed with the leasing
process despite the committee resolution.83
The NWF court criticized the PLF court's construction of section
204(e), and declared that it was indeed the kind of legislative activity
declared unconstitutional in Chadha-provided that the Chadha rationale
applied to the article IV property clause."4 Unconvinced that it did, the
court held that until withdrawn through a formal notice and comment
process, the Secretary of Interior was bound under the Administrative
Procedure Act to abide by his own regulation which incorporated the
section 204(e) provision for congressionally ordered withdrawals.8 5 The
irony of this hypertechnical resolution of an issue of profound constitu-
tional significance did not escape the NWF court, which noted that:
Notice and comment would have afforded scholars and inter-
ested parties, including possibly counsel for the House of Repre-
sentatives, the courtesy and the opportunity to do some of the
research and analysis requisite to a reasoned decision about an
original constitutional question and test the opinions of defen-
dant's advisors.8 6
To this end, the next section of this article examines the history and
development of Congress' powers under the property clause, including an
examination of the appropriate standard of judicial review to be used in
determining the constitutionality of legislation passed under the aegis of
the property clause. This article will then analyze the affect of Chadha on
section 204(e) of FLPMA.
III. THE NATURE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE
PROPERTY CLAUSE
As noted earlier, the Chadha Court emphasized the framers' intent in
82. 571 F. Supp. 1145 (D. D.C. 1983). On the basis of the rationale employed in this case to
enjoin the Secretary from issuing the coal leases, the court later granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment. See National Wildlife Federation v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 825 (D. D.C. 1984). For a
further analysis of these cases and the issue with which they dealt, see Comment, Chadha and the
Public Lands: Is FLPMA Affected?, 5 PuB. LAND L. REv. 55 (1984).
83. National Wildlife Federation, 571 F. Supp. at 1147, 1149.
84. Id. at 1155.
85. Id. at 1157.
86. Id.
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construing the provisions of the Constitution at issue. 7 Given this
approach to constitutional analysis, research into the limits of the legisla-
tive power of Congress under the property clause must address the framers'
intent in drafting and ratifying the clause. This inquiry cannot stop there,
however, as the framers did not contemplate the complex issue at hand in
drafting the property clause. Thus, in resolving this issue, direction must be
sought from previous Supreme Court cases construing the congressional
power under the property clause. While these cases arose in a number of
different contexts, they nonetheless illuminate the scope of congressional
power under the property clause.88
A. The Framers' Intent
The property clause was the result of several important historical
developments. With the Royal Proclamation of 176389 the English Crown
forbid settlement on any land west of the Alleghanies. This attempt by
England to limit settlement of the western territory9" played a significant
role in bringing about the American Revolution of 1776."'
After the thirteen colonies declared their independence from Eng-
land, however, the western lands continued to be a source of tension
between the new states. The six smaller states, which held none of the
western lands, contended that those lands should be held by the central
government for the benefit of all of the states.92 These smaller states feared
87. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. The National Wildlife Federation court also
noted this approach to constitutional analysis by the Burger Court, citing as further examples Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3332-34 (1983) (Chaplains for legislatures); and Solem v. Helm, 103 S.
Ct. 3001, 3006-07 (1983) (proportionality of punishment). National Wildlife Federation, 571 F.
Supp. at 1156.
88. These cases indicate an evolution of congressional power which some commentators have
likened to the judicial development of a broad congressional power under the commerce clause. See
Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 14-15.
89. The Royal Proclamation of October 7,1763, reserved "for the use of the. . .Indians... all the
Lands and territories lying to the Westward of the Sources of the Rivers which fall into the Sea from the
West and Northwest. . . ." i.e., most of the Mississippi valley and its tributaries from the east. See B.
KNOLLENBERG, GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1766-1775 (1975) at 380 n.2.
90. While the stated purpose of the Proclamation was to reserve lands for use by the Indians,
historians have posited that an unstated purpose of the Proclamation was to discourage settlement in
the west as a way of preserving the colonial market for British exports. See B. KNOLLENBERG, ORIGIN
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLtrION: 1759-1766 (1960) at 104.
91. B. KNOLLENBERG, supra note 89, at 198, lists the Proclamation as one often major irritants
in the Colonies prior to 1765. See also L. GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION 139-40 (2d ed.
1962), cited in Brodie, A Question ofEnumeratedPowers: ConstitutionallssuesSurroundingFederal
Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAc. L.J. 693, 695 (198 1). In the Declaration of Independence the
list of colonial grievances against the English Crown included the following: "He has endeavored to
prevent the population of these states; for that purpose, obstructing the laws for naturalization of
foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of
new appropriations of lands."
92. T. DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 60 (1884). The six smaller states were Rhode Island,
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being dominated in the new union by the seven larger states.93 On the other
hand the larger states, which had received title to vast tracts of territory
west of the Appalachian Mountains either by grant from the Crown of
England or by treaty with the Indian tribes, opposed release of these lands
to the central government.94
While this conflict proved a major stumbling block to the ratification
of the Articles of Confederation, it was ultimately resolved by the larger
states releasing their claims to the western territory. 95 These cessions in
turn required Congress to exercise powers of government over them, which
in turn precipitated a new problem, because under the Articles of
Confederation the central government was neither empowered to own any
land within the former colonies, nor given authority to form such land into
new states.96
These deficiencies were among the numerous problems which were
intended to be resolved by the Constitution.97 The pressing nature of these
Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Delaware. These states argued that since
this territory had been secured from Great Britain in the Treaty of 1783 by the blood of the whole
people, this territory should be held by the central government for the benefit of the nation Id.
93. See 3 WAY & GIDEON, JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1788(1823) at 281-
83 cited in Brodie, supra note 91, at 695.
94. T. DONALDSON, supra note 92, at 60. The seven larger states included New York, Virginia,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia. The controversy over the
western lands did not simply pit the smaller states against the larger states. The larger states disputed
among themselves rival claims to this land based on ill-defined and conflicting grants made by different
sovereigns of Great Britain. Id.
95. The Articles of Confederation were adopted by delegates from the thirteen original states on
November 15, 1777. Ratification by the states was not completed, however, until March 1, 1781, by the
action of Maryland, one of the smaller states. T. DONALDSON, supra note 92, at 57. On that same day
the first of the larger states, New York, pursuant to a resolution of Congress, surrendered its claims to
western lands to the Confederation. This lead was followed by Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
and South Carolina, who likewise ceded western lands to the Confederation. A cession of western lands
by North Carolina and Georgia was not affected until after the ratification of the Constitution. Id. at
60, 65.
96. In fact the Articles of Confederation, art. IX, stated that "no State shall be deprived of
territory for the benefit of the United States."
97. Another major problem which grew out of the inability of the central government to own any
land under the Articles of Confederation was the inability of Congress to own and control land on which
the national capitol was located. Congress also lacked the authority to own and control land for the
erection of military installations. To remedy this situation, the framers included among the
enumerated powers of Congress contained in Article I of the Constitution a provision that has come to
be known as the enclave clause:
[Congress shall have power] to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over
such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to
exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards,
and other needful buildings.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 17.
This provision has raised little contemporary controversy over the constitutionality of legislation
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deficiencies was brought into sharper focus by Congress' passage of the
Northwest Territory Ordinance on July 13, 1787, in the course of the
Constitutional Convention.9 Despite the lack of a clear power providing
for such actions,99 Congress provided in the Northwest Territory Ordi-
nance both for the governance of lands in territory outside of the
Confederated States and for the division of this territory into new states.
The response of the framers to these deficiencies sheds important light
on both the nature and limits of the power of Congress over the public
lands. On August 18, 1787, James Madison, a delegate to the Constitu-
tional Convention from Virginia, made a motion for vesting additional
powers in Congress "[t] o dispose of the unappropriated lands of the United
States" and "[t]o institute temporary governments for new states arising
therein."100 These proposals were referred to the Committee of Detail,
which on August 22 reported out a proposal vesting in Congress a power of
considerably wider scope:
[T]o provide, as may become necessary, from time to time, for
the well managing and securing the common property and
general interests and welfare of the United States in such manner
as shall not interfere with the governments of individual States,
in matters which respect only their internal police, or for which
their individual authorities may be competent. 110
Consideration of the Committee's proposal was postponed; then on
August 30 the Convention discussed a proposal for the admission of new
states, which ultimately became article IV, section 3, clause 1.102 In the
affecting these lands. This probably results both from the obvious necessity of such a power as well as
from the Court's rejection of a narrow construction oftheclause. See Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 10-11.
The leading case on this point is Collins v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938), where
the Court stated:
The States of the Union and the National Government may make mutually satisfactory
arrangements as to jurisdiction of territory within their borders and thus in a most effective
way, cooperatively adjust problems flowing from our dual system of government. Jurisdic-
tion obtained by consent or cession may be qualified by agreement or through offer and
acceptance or ratification. It is a matter of arrangement. These arrangements the courts will
recognize and respect.
Id. at 528. See also Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant,
278 U.S. 439 (1929).
98. The Northwest Territory Ordinance, 2 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
957 (1909),was published in full for the first time in Philadelphia, site of the Constitutional
Convention, in the Pennsylvania Herald on July 25, 1787. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1937) at 595 n.2.
99. See C. WARREN, supra note 98, at 591, 595; T. DONALDSON, supra note 92, at 153.
100. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 57, at 321. See also 2 J. MADISON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 189 (1908 ed.).
101. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 57, at 367; 2 J. MADISON, supra note 100, at 226.
102. U.S. CoNsT. art IV, § 3, cl I, provides:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be
formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the
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context of that discussion, the delegates turned to a consideration of the
competing claims of the United States and certain individual states to
portions of the western territory. In an apparent attempt to address both
the earlier concerns for the provisions of an enumerated power of Congress
over this territory, as well as to forge a compromise over the competing
claims to these lands, Gouverneur Morris, a delegate from Pennsylvania,
proposed and the Convention adopted article IV, section 3, clause 2,103 now
commonly referred to as the property clause.'04
While the property clause thus preserved the claims of both the
United States and the existing states to portions of the western territory, it
also granted an enormous power to Congress over "the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States." The implications of this power
were enormous, for while the central government owned little land in the
original thirteen states it did claim ownership of vast tracts of the western
territory. 10 5 Although several commentators have rejected the claim of
broad implications and vigorously argued for an interpretation of the
property clause under which Congress retained only a narrow power over
such lands once they passed from territory to new states, 0 6 the records of
the Constitutional Convention would seem to support a broader power.
Jealousy over the potentially dominating power of the new states that
would eventually be carved from the western territory was voiced at various
times during the Convention,' 0 7 and this concern ultimately had a direct
impact on the new states clause as well as a significant, though more subtle,
impact on the property clause. The Committee of Detail had proposed a
version of the new states clause which provided that "the new States shall
be admitted on the same terms with the original States."' 108 Morris,
Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of
the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
103. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2, provides:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in
this Constitution contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims either of the
United States or of any particular State.
104. For further discussion of the dynamics involved in the adoption of the property clause see C.
WARREN, supra note 98, at 600. See also Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18
ARIM. L. REV. 283, 291 n.24 (1976).
105. Engdahl, supra note 104, at 292.
106. See generally Engdahl, supra note 104; and Brodie, supra note 91.
107. See C. WARREN, supra note 98, at 592-98. Throughout the Convention Morris was one of
the chief protagonists of the idea of admitting future states into the Union with less powers of
representation than the original states. Although Morris' attempt to permanently fix the representation
of the states so that the original states could never be outvoted by the new states failed, his ideas
nevertheless had a profound impact on both the new states clause and property clause. See infra, text
accompanying notes 108-112.
108. Report of the Committee of Detail, August 6, 1787. See 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 57, at
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however, moved to strike this provision, stating that he did not "wish to
throw the power into their hands." 109 Madison countered that the new
western states "neither would nor ought to submit to a Union which
degraded them from an equal rank with the other States."" 0 Morris'
motion, however, carried by a decisive vote.1 "'
Thus, a solid argument can indeed be made that the framers did not
intend to have the new western states enter into the Union on a completely
equal footing with the original states." 2 Seen in this light, the considerable
power over qll federal property seemingly granted to Congress in the
property clause, drafted by Morris soon after his victory over Madison in
the vote over the new states clause, makes sense. The most plausible
construction of the clause is that the framers intended to grant Congress
the power to "make all needful Rules" for the western lands both in its
contemporaneous form as "Territory" and subsequently-as "other Prop-
erty" should a new state be formed from such territory. As discussed below,
however, early opinions by the Supreme Court were not in accord with this
interpretation.
B. Early Supreme Court Developments
In its early years the Supreme Court was. faced with the formidable
task of delineating specific bounds to the powers which the Constitution
had granted in general terms to the coordinate branches of government." 3
In this process of delineation, the Court drew a sharp distinction between a
broadly construed power of Congress over the public lands in the territory
of the United States, and a more limited power over the same land once the
territory it was located in achieved statehood. While this distinction has
been relied on by recent advocates of a narrow federal power over the
public lands,114 the importance of this distinction has largely receded in the
109. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 57, at 454.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. Only Maryland and Virginia voted to admit new states on equal terms with the original
states.
112. Given the framers' intent, the Supreme Court's enunciation of the equal footing doctrine in
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), and subsequent cases is open to criticism. Without
examining the framers' intent, the Court in Pollard held that "The new states have the same rights,
sovereignty and jurisdiction" over navigable streambeds as were retained by the original states. Id. at
230. More in keeping with the framers' intent is an equal footing doctrine premised on equality of
political authority as opposed to jurisdiction over or ownership of public lands in the new state. See
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950). See also notes 130-145 and accompanying text,
infra.
113. See generally, C. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENTAND POLITICS 1789-1835 (1960 ed.); see alsoJ. SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURTAS FINAL
ARBITER IN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 1789-1957 (1973).
114. See generally, Engdall, supra note 105; Brodie, supra note 92.
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face of a more expansive reading of the property clause. 15 Nevertheless, as
will be seen, these early developments remain important to an understand-
ing of the nature of the contemporary power of Congress under the
property clause.
1. The Power of Congress Over the Territory
In two early cases, Sere & Laralde v. Pitot"6 and American Insurance
Co. v. Canter,"7 Chief Justice Marshall authored opinions upholding in
broad terms the power of Congress to govern the territory of the United
States." 8 In Sere & Laralde the Court declared:
[W]e find Congress possessing and exercising the absolute and
undisputed power of governing and legislating for the territory of
Orleans. Congress has given them a legislative, an executive, and
a judiciary, with such powers as it has been their will to assign to
those departments respectively." 9
In line with the power of Congress outlined in Sere & Laralde, the
Court in American Insurance Co. upheld Congress' creation of an article I,
as opposed to an article III, territorial court.120 In explaining both the
nature of these courts as well as the basis to the power of Congress to create
such courts, the American Insurance Co. Court stated:
These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general
government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it.
They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right
of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that
clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and
regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. Thejurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part
of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the
Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of
115. See, e.g., Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543, where the Court found that under the property clause
Congress had a broad power to enact legislation respecting the public lands in the states, and that such
legislation preempted conflicting state legislation under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
116. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810).
117. 26 U.S. (I Peters) 511 (1828).
118. In both cases the property clause was relied on as an alternative source of congressional
power over the territory of the United States. The Court also noted in each case that such a power was
an incident of sovereignty over these lands. See Sere and Laralde, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 336, and
American Insurance Co., 26 U.S. (I Pet.) at 542.
119. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 337.
120. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) at 544-45. The American Insurance Co. Court upheld the validity of an
admiralty judgment rendered by a Florida territorial court which was comprised of untenured judges.
The Court held that the article IV property clause encompassed the power to establish courts which did
not have to meet the tenure and salary requirements of federal judges as specified in article III, and that
such courts could nevertheless exercise the subject matter jurisdiction described in article III. Id.
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those general powers which that body possesses over the territo-
ries of the United States. 2'
Subsequent opinions uniformly confirmed the plenary nature of
Congress' power over the territory, 122 subject only to minimal limita-
tions. 123 Although once the source of much controversy, 124 the passage of
most of the territory into statehood has resulted in little controversy in this
area in recent years. The extraordinary dimensions of this power were,
however, underscored by the recent Supreme Court opinion in Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 125 where the Court held that the
bankruptcy court system, created by Congress under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1970,126 violated Article III of the Constitution. 127 The
plurality opinion of Northern Pipeline Co. stated that the separation of
powers doctrine, of which article III was an integral part, allowed Congress
to create legislative courts in only
three narrow situations, each recognizing a circumstance in
which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive
Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional
that the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative
courts was consistent with, rather than threatening to, the
constitutional mandate of separation of powers. 2"
Significantly, the Northern Pipeline Co. Court cited American
Insurance Co. and recognized the property clause as one source of such an
"exceptional" power, which allowed Congress to create non-article III
territorial courts. 129 Thus, Northern Pipeline Co. stands as an important
121. Id. at 545.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526 (1840); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. 164
(1854); Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. 73 (1875); Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
123. In Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. at 142, the Court stated that while the citizens of a
territory lacked full constitutional rights, the power of Congress over the territories was nevertheless
"not without limitations." The Court went on to state that the limitation, in any given case depended on
"whether the territory had been incorporated into the United States as a body politic." Id. at 143.
124. See, e.g., The Acquisition and Government of Territory, in 3 Selected Essays on
Constitutional Law 436-526 (1938).
125. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
126. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-82 (1976, Supp. IV).
127. Northern Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. at 86-87, n. 39. U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 1 provides in
relevant part: "The judges both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their Continuance in Office." For a discussion of the constitutional basis to the
legislative courts and the article III courts see Hughes, The Constitutionality ofthe Bankruptcy Court
and the Ongoing Search for a Principled Distinction Between Article land Article III Courts: A Re-
Evaluation After Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 35 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 829 (1984).
128. 458 U.S. at 64.
129. Id. at 64-65. Along similar lines, the Northern Pipeline Co. plurality opinion recognized the
validity of the legislative court system of the District of Columbia under the enclave clause, U.S.
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contemporary Supreme Court precedent acknowledging the "historically
and constitutionally" unique power of Congress under the property clause
in the separation of powers context.
2. The Power of Congress Over the Public Lands in the States
Unlike the territories, the states created out of the public domain
received the residuary of the unenumerated powers of the Constitution."n
Moreover, the enclave clause provided an enumerated power of Congress
over public lands in the states held for specific purposes.' As such, the
Supreme Court in its early decisions conceived of the nature of the power of
Congress over public lands in the states in a fundamentally different
manner than the way in which it conceived of the power of Congress over
public lands in the territories.
On the basis of this distinction, the Court developed in the term
immediately following Chief Justice Marshall's death, two formidable
limitations on the power of Congress over the public lands in new states
created out of former territorial lands. Though interrelated, these con-
straints were premised on two separate doctrinal developments. One
limitation was premised on the already existent doctrine of enumerated
powers.1 32 The second limitation, more fully developed in subsequent
opinions, came to be known as the equal footing doctrine.133 Since these
doctrines have historically provided the most significant limitations on the
exercise of power by Congress under the property clause, a brief examina-
tion of them is in order.
In the early case of New Orleans v. United States,' the Supreme
CoNsr. art. i, § 8, cl. 17. Id. The two other "narrow situations" in which the Court approved legislative
courts were military courts, and legislative courts which adjudicate cases involving "public rights"
created through acts of Congress. Id. at 66-69.
130. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
131. See, supra note 97.
132. Chief Justice Marshall set forth this doctrine, and pointed to its inherently unsettled
nature, as follows:
This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that
it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent to have required to be
enforced by all those arguments which its enlightened friends, while it was depending before
the people, found it necessary to urge. That principle is now universally admitted. But the
question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted is perpetually arising, and will
probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
133. According to the equal footing doctrine, the Constitution requires that all states be
admitted into the Union on a status equal to that of the original thirteen states. While this is a seemingly
simple proposition, the Supreme Court has labored long and hard to determine what factors must be
considered when rendering such ajudgment. See generally Hanna, Equal Footing In the Admission of
States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951).
134. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
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Court was faced with the question of whether the State of Louisiana or the
United States owned title to and had jurisdiction over certain river front
lots in the City of New Orleans, which lots had formerly been held by the
Spanish crown before the Louisiana Territory was ceded by treaty to the
United States. In holding that the state had both title to and jurisdiction
over these lands, the New Orleans Court relied on a two-pronged rationale.
First, the Court used the doctrine of enumerated powers to construe the
power of Congress over public land in the states in very narrow terms:
Special provision is made in the constitution, for the cession of
jurisdiction from the states over places where the federal govern-
ment shall establish forts, or other military works. And it is only
in these places, or in the territories of the United States, where it
can exercise a general jurisdiction. 13 5
Then, the New Orleans Court used the terms of the act admitting
Louisiana into statehood to further preclude the claim of congressional
jurisdiction over the public lands at issue:
The State of Louisiana was admitted into the union, on the same
footing as the original states. Her rights of sovereignty are the
same, and by consequence no jurisdiction of the federal govern-
ment, either for purposes of police or otherwise, can be exercised
over this public ground, which is not common to the United
States. 136
This narrow construction of the property clause, along with the
concern for the equality of the states, served as a precursor to the equal
footing doctrine, as developed by the Court in Pollard v. Hagan.37 In
Pollard, the Court was faced with a dispute between plaintiffs who claimed
title to Alabama tidelands under a patent from the United States and
defendants who claimed title under a prior Spanish land grant.'38 As in
New Orleans, the Pollard Court relied on the doctrine of enumerated
powers to find a narrow congressional power to own and govern public land
in a state, as opposed to a broad power over the public lands in a territory. 3 9
Then, in apparent reliance on the property clause, the tenth amendment,
and the new states clause, the Pollard Court set forth the elements of what
has come to be known as the equal footing doctrine:
First, The shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them,
were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but
were reserved to the states respectively. Secondly, The new states
have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this
135. Id. at 737.
136. Id.
137. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
138. Id. at 219-20.
139. Id. at 223-25.
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subject as the original states. Thirdly, The right of the United
States to the public lands, and the power of Congress to make all
needful rules and regulations for the sale and disposition thereof,
conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in contro-
versy in this case.140
Subsequent cases relied on this doctrine to firmly establish the right of
the respective states to title in the navigable river beds and tidelands within
their borders. 4 ' A century after Pollard, however, a series of Supreme
Court opinions142 established the equal footing doctrine as a two-edged
sword which was used to sharply limit the claims of coastal states to
anything but immediately adjacent tidelands.143 Moreover, these more
recent opinions established the equal footing doctrine as premised on a
guarantee of political equality, and not economic equality, of which
ownership of the public lands is seen as an incident.14  While this narrow
interpretation of the equal footing doctrine is a far cry from the doctrine as
set forth in Pollard, it is arguably more in keeping with what we know of
the framers' intent. 4 5
C. The Emergence Of A Preemptive Congressional Power Over The
Public Lands
In light of New Orleans and Pollard, the doctrine of enumerated
140. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229-30.
141. Mumford v. Wardell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423 (1867); Wever v. Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 37 (1873); Knight v. United Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391 (1903); United States v. State of Oregon, 295
U.S. 1 (1935).
142. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1946); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699
(1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
143. In United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 32 (1947), the Court noted that none of the
original thirteen states owned the three mile belt which stretched seaward from the low tide mark. On
this basis, the California Court refused to extend the Pollard doctrine to include state ownership of this
land, ruling instead that the federal government held paramount rights to this land. Id. at 38. Three
years later, in United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707,718 (1950), the Court affirmed its earlier ruling in
California.
144. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 716 (citations omitted):
The "equal footing" clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to sovereignty.
It does not, of course, include economic stature or standing. There has never been equality
among the states in that sense. Some states when they entered the Union had within their
boundaries tracts of land belonging to the Federal Government; others were sovereigns of
their soil. Some had special agreements with the Federal Government governing property
within their borders. Area, location, geology, and latitude have created great diversity in the
economic aspects of the several States. The requirement of equal footing was designed not to
wipe out those diversities but to create parity as respects political standing and sovereignty.
145. As earlier indicated, the framers voted for equality of political representation of the new
states under article I of the Constitution, but firmly rejected the proposal under Article IV that all new
states be admitted to the Union on a completely equal basis with the original states. See supra notes 89-
112 and accompanying text.
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powers and the equal footing doctrine loomed as major limits on the
exercise of congressional power over the public lands in the states. The
Supreme Court, however, contemporaneously developed other major
strands of property clause doctrine which acted to preserve a large measure
of congressional control over those lands, even before the Supreme Court
sharply limited the scope of the equal footing doctrine in the middle of the
twentieth century.
Although not denominated as such in early opinions, these strands
were marked on the one hand by the Court's broad application of the
preemption doctrine, 14 6 and on the other hand by the Court's refusal to
apply the nondelegation doctrine. 47 Each strand continues to exert an
important influence on the contemporary power of Congress under the
property clause, and as such an understanding of them is important to our
study.
1. Early Preemption Cases
In Wilcox v. Jackson14 8 the Supreme Court was faced with resolving
competing claims of title to a military fort in the State of Illinois. A settler
claimed title to this land under a preemption statute passed by Congress in
1834,149 and on this basis argued that Illinois law was now controlling. 50 In
holding for the federal government the Court rejected the settler's claim,
and instead found a broad preemptive power to be vested in Congress
through the property clause,15' under the shadow of which state property
law must operate:
We hold the true principle to be this, that whenever the question
in any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land Which had
146. When Congress exercises a constitutional power, the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2, mandates that federal law preempts a state law when there is a conflict between the two laws.
See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (2d ed. 1983). Chief Justice
Marshall succinctly set forth the preemption doctrine as follows: "If any one proposition could
command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the government of
the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 405.
147. Article I, § I of the Constitution assigns all legislative power to Congress. Under the
nondelegation doctrine, "[T]he Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested." A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). See also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
148. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839).
149. Id. at 510. Preemption in the public land law context was the preferential right of a settler to
buy his claim at a modest price without competitive bidding. See COGGINS AND WILKINSON, supra
note 9, at 67.
150. Wilcox, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 516.
151. The federal government claimed that it held title to the land at issue by virtue of a
presidential withdrawal made pursuant to the authorizing legislation, and by a saving clause in the
preemption statute.:Id. at 511-12.
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once been the property of the United States has passed, that
question must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but
that whenever, according to those laws, the title shall have
passed, then that property, like all other property in the state is
subject to state legislation; so far as that legislation is consistent
with the admission that the title passed and vested according to
the laws of the United States. 152
In the term immediately following the Wilcox decision, the Supreme
Court faced another challenge to the exercise of congressional power over
the public lands in the State of Illinois. In United States v. Gratiot'53 the
defendants attempted to avoid contractual obligations under a license
issued by the President for mining lead on the public lands. The defendants
raised two issues, arguing first that the executive branch lacked the
authority to enter into such a contract," and second that such use of the
public lands encroached upon states rights. 5 5 The Court soundly rejected
both arguments. Finding that under the property clause the power of
Congress over these lands is "without limitation," the Court upheld the
President's authority under a broad statutory delegation of power.' 56 In
disposing of the state rights claim the Court simply concluded: "She surely
cannot claim a right to the public lands within her limits."' 57
The Gratiot Court's finding that Congress' power over the public
lands in a state was "without limitation" was significant, since the Court
had formerly found such a broad power under the property clause to apply
only to the territories. 58 Subsequent opinions concerned with the issue of
congressional power under the property clause have continued to apply this
standard to both the territories"' and the states. 60
Thus, contemporaneous with the development of the limiting strands
of property clause doctrine that the Court set forth in New Orleans and
152. Id. at 517.
153. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
154. Id. at 537.
155. Id. at 538.
156. Id. at 537.
157. Id. at 538.
158. See Sere & Laralde v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 337 (1810); American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511, 537 (1828).
-159. See cases cited in footnote 122, supra.
160. See Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92,99 (1871); United States v. San Francisco,
310 U.S. 16,29 (1940); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19,27 (1947); Federal Power Comm'n v.
Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952); Ala. v. Tex., 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); Ivanhoe Irrigation
Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-95 (1958); Kleppe v. N.M., 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976). While
the Kleppe Court observed that the Supreme Court had repeatedly found that under the property
clause Congress' power over the public lands was "without limitations," the Court also cryptically
noted that "the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been
definitively resolved .... Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539.
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Pollard, there began to emerge, in Wilcox and Gratiot, another strand of
property clause doctrine that sustained a broad congressional power over
the public lands in the states. As subsequent case law confirmed, Wilcox
and Gratiot were precursor's of the contemporary property clause doc-
trine, which has eclipsed the influence of New Orleans and Pollard.
Although the principle of a broad congressional power over the public
lands came to dominate property clause doctrine, it was a gradual process
resisted at every step by those who continued to argue for a narrow
congressional power. The Court's responses to these individual controver-
sies have gradually added definition to the general principles set forth in
Wilcox and Gratiot.
2. The Dual Nature of Congress' Preemptive Power Over the Public
Lands
One important component of the preemptive federal power over the
public lands is its dual nature, whereby Congress acts as both a proprietor
and a legislature for such lands. The dual nature of Congress' power was
first clearly delineated in Camfield v. United States,16 1 where the Supreme
Court was called upon to resolve a challenge to the constitutionality of the
Enclosures Act of 1885.162 In Camfield a private landowner had devised a
clever fencing scheme that enclosed a large amount of federal land with
fences that were located solely on private land, and on this basis the
defendant claimed to be beyond federal jurisdiction.163 The Supreme
Court rejected this contention on two counts. First, the Camfield Court
found that under the property clause Congress held a proprietorial power
over the public lands which would have sustained a trespass action against
the defendant, even in the absence of legislation prohibiting such an act.1 64
Second, the Court found that Congress was vested with a broad preemptive
161. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
162. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061-66 (1982). The Act was the result of numerous fencing schemes
enclosing enormous tracts of federal lands that were interspersed with sections granted to the railroads.
Another provision of the Act prohibited individuals from preventing other persons the right of entry
onto and passage over the public lands. Relying on Camfield, the Supreme Court upheld this provision
in McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353,359 (1922). See Gaetke, Congressional Discretion Under
the Property Clause, 33 HASTINGs. L.J. 381, 389-90 (1981).
163. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 522.
164. The Camfield Court explained:
[T] he Government has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an ordinary proprietor, to
maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers. It may deal with such lands precisely as
a private individual may deal with his farming property.... It needs no argument to show
that the building of fences upon public lands with intent to enclose them for private use
would be a mere trespass, and that such fences might be abated by the officers of the
Government or by the ordinary processes of courts of justice.
Id. at 524.
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legislative power over the public lands, which provided a sound constitu-
tional basis to the legislation at issue.'65
Subsequent opinions have confirmed the dual nature of Congress'
power over the public lands under the property clause.'66 A significant
implication that arises from the exercise of this power is that when
Congress makes "needful rules and regulations" respecting the public
lands, it is not necessarily acting pursuant to its legislative power as set
forth in article I of the Constitution. Rather, under the property clause,
Congress has the additional latitude of a proprietor who is vested with a
considerable amount of discretion in the manner in which it chooses to
manage the lands entrusted to it.
On this basis, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the distinctive
nature of legislation affecting the public lands, and upheld delegations of
congressional power which otherwise might not have been sustained. 67
3. The Nondelegation Doctrine and The Distinctive Character of Legis-
lation Concerning the Public Lands
In Butte City Water Co. v. Baker,16 8 the Supreme Court upheld both a
broad statutory delegation of authority to local miners to make regulations
governing the location of mining claims, and an implied delegation of
authority which allowed the states to legislate in this area. 6 9 In rejecting
the appellant's argument that this was an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, 70 the Court noted that the proprietorial power of
Congress under the property clause gave legislation respecting the public
lands a distinctive character:
165. The Camfield Court found:
The general Government doubtless has a power over its own property analogous to the police
power of the several States, and the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is
measured by the exigencies of the particular case.... A different rule would place the public
domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.
Id. at 525-26.
166. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911); United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 297 (1929); Ala. v. Tex., 347 U.S.
272, 273 (1954); Kleppe v. N.M., 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976).
167. More traditional delegations of power to federal administrative agencies have, not
surprisingly, likewise been upheld. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), where the
Court upheld regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to a delegation of
power contained in the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-81 (1982). The rule relied
on by the Grimaud Court, id. at 520, was set forth by the Supreme Court in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S.
649, 694 (1892) as follows:
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government.
168. 196 U.S. 119 (1905).
169. Id. at 127.
170. Id. at 125.
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While the disposition of these lands is provided for by Congres-
sional legislation, such legislation savors somewhat of mere rules
prescribed by an owner of property for its disposal. It is not a
legislative character in the highest sense of the term, and as an
owner may delegate to his principal agent the right to employ
subordinates, giving to them a limited discretion, so it would
seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to the local legisla-
ture the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal
of these lands.17 1
The broad latitude accorded congressional use of its proprietorial
power under the property clause was again relied on by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 72 to find and uphold an implied
delegation of authority to the President, which empowered him to
withdraw from private location large tracts of oil rich public land.1 73
In light of Butte City Water Co. and Midwest Oil Co., strong
precedents exist in support of the proposition that, in exercising its
proprietorial power over the public lands, Congress is not strictly bound by
the traditional constraints of the nondelegation doctrine. The implications
of this proposition are significant in light of the apparent revival of the
nondelegation doctrine by the Supreme Court in Chadha. In Chadha the
linchpin to the decision was provided by the Court's determination that the
legislative veto provision of the INA delegated to a single committee of
Congress the power to perform an essentially legislative act in violation of
the article I requirements of presentment and bicameralism. 174
4. Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Consolidation of Preemptive Congres-
sional Control of the Public Lands
Any doubts about the preemptive nature of congressional control over
the public lands were firmly resolved by the Supreme Court in Kleppe v.
New Mexico.1 75 In Kleppe the State of New Mexico challenged the
constitutionality of the Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act,1 76
171. Id. at 126.
172. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
173. Id. at 474: "[W]hile no such express authority has been granted, there is nothing in the
nature of the power exercised which prevents Congress from granting it by implication just as could be
done by any other owner of property under similar conditions."
174. 103 S. Ct. at 2780-88. The last time that the Court invoked the nondelegation doctrine to
invalidate a federal statute was in 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
Uniformly seen as dormant or dead, commentators were surprised to see the doctrine play a pivotal role
in the Chadha decision.See Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha andtheNondelegationDoctrine, 35 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 749, 750-51 (1984).
175. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
176. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The Act was passed in 1971 to protect
unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States from capture,
branding, harassment, or death. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 531.
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arguing that under the property clause Congress possessed only a narrow
power to control animals that were damaging the public lands, and that
otherwise the state retained legislative jurisdiction over wildlife on the
public lands. 177
In rejecting the state's narrow reading of the property clause the
Kleppe Court provided a contemporary validation of several strands of
property clause doctrine. Reducing the constitutional issue to whether the
Act was a "needful" regulation "respecting" the public lands, 78 the Court
answered that under the property clause this was a determination
entrusted to Congress.' Moreover, the Court noted that in legislating for
the public lands "Congress exercises the power both of a proprietor and of a
legislature over the public domain."' 80 And when Congress exercised this
power under the property clause, "the federal legislation necessarily
overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause."'' The
Kleppe opinion thus consolidated and affirmed several of the major strands
of property clause doctrine that had developed over the course of one
hundred and fifty years.'8 2
D. The Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review for Property
Clause Legislation
Two interrelated issues underlie the concept of judicial review of
congressional acts. The first issue involves the determination of who shall
passjudgment on the constitutionality of legislation. Since the early case of
Marbury v. Madison, 83 a precept of American jurisprudence has been the
assumption that the Supreme Court possesses the power to declare certain
acts of other branches of the national government to be outside the bounds
of the Constitution.8 4 Conversely, the second issue involves a corollary of
that fundamental power, whereby the Court accords deference to those
177. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 533. New Mexico claimed jurisdiction over the wild horses and burros
on the public lands within its borders under the New Mexico Estray Law, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-14-1
(1966). Id. at 532.
178. Id. at 536.
179. Id. at 539, citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. at 29-30; Light v. United States,
220 U.S. at 537 and United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 537-38.
180. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540, citing Ala. v. Tex., 347 U.S. at 273; Sinclair v. United States, 279
U.S. at 297; and United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. at 474.
181. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543, citing U.S. CoNsT. art. Vl, cl. 2; Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S.
96, 100 (1928); and McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. at 359.
182. Not all commentators agree with this conclusion. Cf. Engdahl, supra note 104, at 549-58.
183. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
184. In Marbury the Supreme Court for the first time voided an act of Congress on the basis that
it was inconsistent with the Constitution, stating that "all those who have framed written constitutions
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the
theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution is
void." Id. at 177.
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acts of the coordinate branches that derive from their constitutionally
assigned powers. 18 5 The Supreme Court set forth this maxim as follows in
the early case of McCulloch v. Maryland18 6
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.1 17
While the first issue is outside the scope of this article,1 88 a consideration of
the second issue is germane to a discussion of the appropriate standard of
judicial review to be used by the Court in passing on the constitutionality of
property clause legislation.
In sustaining a broad preemptive power of Congress under the
property clause, the Supreme Court in Kleppe applied a deferential
standard of judicial review: "[W] e must remain mindful that, while courts
must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the Property
Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress."'8 9 While the
Supreme Court in the post-Lochner era has as a general rule shown
deference to congressional enactments, 190 the standard as applied to
185. This principle also derives from Marbury, id. at 165-66. For a comprehensive treatment of
both issues see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
186. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
187. Id. at 421.
188. Some commentators have contended that the text of the Constitution provides no explicit
support for the assumption by the Supreme Courtof the powerof passing on the constitutionality of acts
of Congress or the President:
The power which distinguishes the Supreme Court of the United States is that of
constitutional review of actions of the other branches of government, federal and state.
Curiously enough, this power of judicial review, as it is called, does not derive from any
explicit constitutional command. The authority to determine the meaning and application
of a written constitution is nowhere defined or even mentioned in the document itself.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1 (1962). This situation imposes a certain irony on the
edicts of the Berger Court vis-a-vis the Congress, where the Court has adopted a strict interpretivist
point of view in passing on the constitutionality of legislation.
189. 426 U.S. at 536. CitingUnited Statesv. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,29-30 (1940); Light v.
United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537-38
(1840).
190. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court invalidated a state law
aimed at improving the working conditions of bakery workers. The period from 1905 until 1937 is
described as the Lochner era, and it refers to the Supreme Court's willingness during this time to pass
judgment on and invalidate state and federal social and economic legislation as violative of the
substantive due process requirements of the Constitution, i.e. the guarantee that legislation have a
rational relationship to a legitimate end of government. In the post-Lochner era the Court has shown
considerably more deference to such legislative enactments. While the "rational relationship"
requirement remains, it is now presumed by the Court to exist. The classic statement of this
contemporary standard of judicial review was set forth by Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), where he explianed that
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for
regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
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legislation passed under the property clause derives from different consti-
tutional stock. In light of the Supreme Court's willingness in Chadha to
overcome the deference generally accorded legislation, 191 it is important to
understand the distinctive nature of the deference that the Court has
traditionally accorded property clause enactments. As such, the cases cited
by the Kleppe Court in support of a deferential standard of judicial review
for property clause legislation, United States v. San Francisco,'9' Light v.
United States,9 3 and United States v. Gratiot,94 are examined below.
It will be recalled that Gratiot served as an important counterpoint to
other early cases which had sharply limited Congress' power over the
public lands in the states.'95 In upholding legislation allowing the President
to lease lead mines located on public land within the State of Illinois, the
Gratiot Court stated that under the property clause the power over those
lands "is vested in Congress without limitation."' 96 Because such a broad
congressional power had formerly been limited to the public lands in the
territory of the United States, 97 Gratiot stands as a seminal decision in the
development of contemporary property clause doctrine. The Kleppe
Court's reliance on Gratiot as authority in support of judicial deference
was a significant reaffirmation of the expansive power of Congress under
the property clause.
In San Francisco the Supreme Court again upheld legislation passed
by Congress pursuant to the property clause,1 98 relying on Gratiot for the
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such
a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.
Appended to the passage set out above was the now famous "footnote 4," in which Justice Stone held
out the possibility of a stricter standard of judicial review of legislation impacting individual rights:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth ....
Id. at 152 n.4. The Court has subsequently adopted a strict scrutiny standard for such legislation. See,
NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, supra note 146, at 443-52. See also TRIBE, supra note 70, at 434-36.
191. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2780-81:
We turn now to the question whether action of one House of Congress under § 244(c)(2)
violates strictures of the Constitution. We begin, of course, with the presumption that the
challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a challenged action
does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained ....
192. 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
193. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
194. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
195. See supra notes 146-60 and accompanying text.
196. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 537.
197. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
198. The San Francisco Court upheld legislation which imposed strict limits on the City of San
Francisco in selling electricity produced at a hydroelectric facility located on lands given to the city by
the federal government. San Francisco, 310 U.S. at 29-30.
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principle that "[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress
is without limitations."1 99 Quoting Light, the San Francisco Court then
juxtaposed an axiom of this principle: "And it is not for the courts to say
how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine. 2 0 0
The relationship between the existence of a trust and a deferential
standard of judicial review was more fully developed in Light, where the
Supreme Court stated:
"All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people
of the whole country." United States v. Trinidad Coal Co, 137
U.S. 160. And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be
administered. That is for Congress to determine. The courts
cannot compel it to set aside the lands for settlement; or to suffer
them to be used for agricultural or grazing purposes; nor
interfere when, in the exercise of its discretion, Congress estab-
lishes a forest reserve for what it decides to be national and public
purposes. °1
The Kleppe Court's use of Light in support of judicial deference is
significant in several respects. Although Light was decided at the height of
the Lochner era, the Supreme Court accorded Congress complete defer-
ence as to a legislative act passed under the property clause, despite
potentially serious economic impacts on private parties. This illustrates the
distinctive nature of such legislation. Additionally, the Light Court stated
in effect that the deference which the Court accorded to such legislation
derived from the fact that under the property clause Congress holds the
public lands in trust for the people of the nation.
This trust analogy reinforces the notion of a proprietorial power of
Congress under the property clause, as a trust is a "right of property, real or
personal, held by one party for the benefit of another.202 While several
commentators have recently developed arguments in favor of extending
the public trust doctrine so as to impose responsibilities on administrative
agencies and Congress,20 3 the Supreme Court cases using trust language
vis-a-vis Congress stand in support of a broad congressional power with
199. Id. at 29.
200. Id. at 29-30. The San Francisco Court had earlier analogized the role of Congress under
legislation passed under the property clause to a trustee: "Congress, in effect trustee of public lands for
all the people, has by this Act sought to protect and control the disposition of a section of the public
domain." Id. at 28.
201. 220 U.S. at 537. This is the page of the Light opinion cited by the Kleppe Court in support of
a deferential standard of judicial review. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536.
202. Black's Law Dictionary 1352 (5th ed. 1979).
203. See. e.g., Note, Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government Under the Public Land
Trust, 75 MICH. L. REv. 586,591 (1977); Wilkinson, ThePublic Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law,
14 U. CAL. DAVis L. REv. 269 (1980).
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attendant judicial deference.20 4
IV. AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 204(e) OF FLPMA
The materials examined in the preceding section indicate that the
property clause is rich in history and extraordinary in character. At the
very least, these materials provide the basis to a legitimate argument in
favor of exempting the legislative veto provision contained in section
204(e) of FLPMA from the strictures for legislation set forth in Chadha.
Any such argument, however, will have to confront the broad20 5 and
absolutist20 language of Chadha. Thus, whether the argument will
ultimately prevail remains a difficult question which will present a court
confronting the issue with a genuine "hard case. 21 0 7 Without denying the
weight of the opposing argument, 0 8 the reasons for upholding the
constitutionality of section 204(e) are outlined below.
In declaring unconstitutional the legislative veto provisions of the
INA, the Chadha Court placed heavy emphasis on both the text of the
Constitution and the framers' intent in crafting "the constitutional design
for the separation of powers."' 09 Applying this method of analysis to the
powers of Congress under the property clause, it appears that the text of the
clause itself is clear in assigning to Congress a broad power to make rules
and regulations respecting the public lands. This plain reading of the clause
is reinforced by the understanding that the clause traces back both to
colonial resentment of control of the western territories by the English
204. For cases discussing the public land trust held by Congress, see United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 28 (1940); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409
(1919); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523,537 (1911); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,524
(1897); Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891); United States v. Trinidad Coal
& Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890).
205. The Chadha Court broadly defined a legislative act as one having "the purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons... outside of the legislative branch." Chadha,
103 S. Ct. at 2784.
206. The Chadha Court saw little latitude in the congressional exercise of legislative power: "It
emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers'
decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure." Id.
207. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 79-130 (1977). According to Professor
Dworkin, hard cases are those in which the Court must choose between competing sets of principles and
policies which are both in some sense legitimate. Despite the difficulty of the endeavor, in Dworkin's
theory there is a correct decision which is indicated by the result which best "fits" into the overarching
scheme of the general principles and policies of the legal system.
208. See, e.g., P. Baldwin, The Effects of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha on
Certain Provisions in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Cong. Research Serv., Libr. of
Cong. (August 19, 1983, rev. September 14, 1983).
209. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2781.
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Crown, 1 ° and later to the framers' concern that the new states carved from
the territories not come to exert an inordinate political power over the older
states.21" From these concerns emerged the framers' decision to vest in
Congress the "Power to . . .make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States."212
Early Supreme Court decisions recognized the consequence of this
political decision: under the property clause Congress was vested with an
exceptional power which exempted property clause legislation from the
strictures of the separation of powers doctrine which would otherwise
operate to limit congressional action.21 3 Recently, in resolving the separa-
tion of powers issue raised by the creation of the bankruptcy court system,
the Supreme Court relied on such early precedent in noting that the
property clause was an example of a grant to the legislative branch of a
power that "was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that the
congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was consis-
tent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of
separation of powers. '214
Over the course of the last century and a half, the Supreme Court has
relied on that "historically and constitutionally" exceptional power of
Congress to uphold property clause legislation from a broad array of
challenges. Chief among these challenges has been the contention that
under the tenth amendment the states should exercise jurisdiction over the
public lands within their borders. With the notable exception of the equal
footing doctrine, which has itself receded in significance," 5 the Supreme
Court has consistently found a broad preemptive power vested in Congress
through the property clause.216 In the contemporary landmark decision of
Kleppe v. New Mexico,17 the Supreme Court strongly affirmed the
preemptive nature of this power.
210. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
212. U.S. COrsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
213. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text. Recall that in the early cases of Sare &
Laralde v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332 (1810), and American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 511 (1828), the Supreme Court upheld the creation by Congress of legislatively controlled court
systems in the territories against the charge that such courts violated the requirements for federal
courts set forth in article III of the Constitution.
214. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,64 (1982).
The Northern Pipeline Court quoted at length from the American Insurance Co. decision to illustrate
this point. Id. at 65.
215. See supra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 149-61 and accompanying text.
217. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
1985]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
The supremacy clause2 1 8 guarantees preemption of state laws by all
federal legislation passed pursuant to the Constitution. Therefore, the
significance of Kleppe and its predecessors lies not in the Court's applica-
tion of the preemption doctrineper se, but in the underlying decision by the
Court to reject a narrow reading of the powers of Congress under the
property clause, finding instead a power broad enough to support diverse
legislation. 19 As the Kleppe Court noted, the primary question involved in
such preemption analysis is whether the legislation is a "needful" regula-
tion "respecting" the public lands.220
Moreover, as established by a long line of Supreme Court opinions,
when Congress makes "needful rules and regulations" respecting the
public lands, it is not necessarily acting pursuant to its legislative powers as
set forth in article I of the Constitution. 221 Rather, "Congress exercises the
powers both of a proprietor and a legislature over the public domain."222
The dual nature of Congress' preemptive power over the public lands
carries with it the significant implication that property clause legislation is
not strictly bound by the same requirements which are imposed on article I
legislation, such as that at issue in Chadha.22*
This distinctive character of the property clause power has also been
relied on in upholding both implied delegations of authority to the
executive,224 and broad delegations of rulemaking authority to the
States.225 The proprietarial nature of the property clause power could
likewise be used to argue in favor of the delegation of power contained in
section 204(e) of FLPMA, which vests decision-making power in two
committees of Congress.
Perhaps more significant than any single manifestation of Congress'
powers under the property clause, however, is the deferential standard of
judicial review which the Court has fashioned in response to the finding
218. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
219. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1896) (upholding extra territorial
application of property clause legislation forbidding enclosures of public lands); Light v. United States,
220 U.S. 523 (1911) (upholding property clause legislation regulating grazing on the public lands);
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (upholding property clause legislation protecting wild
burros and horses).
220. 426 U.S. at 536, 539.
221. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
222. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 540.
223. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
224. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
225. Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905).
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that "determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to
the judgment of Congress. 226 Deriving a trust analogy from this basis,227
the Court has on numerous occasions declared that as trustee of the public
lands, the power of Congress is "without limitation. 2 8 While such an
absolute claim to power would undoubtedly recede in some circum-
stances,229 it nevertheless serves to bolster the strong attitude of judicial
deference accorded property clause legislation.
Further, given this deferential underpinning, a strong argument can
be advanced in favor of the application of the political question doctrine230
to the controversy between the executive branch and the legislative branch
over the constitutionality of section 204(e) of FLPMA. Although the
Chadha Court refused to apply the political question doctrine in its
consideration of the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision of the
INA,231 there is a substantial distinction between that provision and the
legislative veto provision contained in section 204(e) of FLPMA. As
discussed previously, the judicial deference accorded property clause
legislation derives from different constitutional stock than the deference
generally accorded legislation passed pursuant to Congress' article I
powers.232
In the leading contemporary formulation of the political question
doctrine set forth in Baker v. Carr, 233 the Supreme Court stated that the
doctrine was "essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent
on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department .... 23 4 As set forth above, the property
clause would meet the criteria in the case of resolving the constitutionality
of section 204(e) of FLPMA. As such, the Court's determination to invoke
the political question doctrine would not only be consistent with the strong
tradition of judicial deference generally accorded property clause legisla-
226. Kieppe, 426 U.S. at 536, citing United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,29-30 (1940);
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523,537 (1911); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526,537-
538 (1840).
227. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
229. For instance, a court might legitimately feel compelled to apply stricter judicial scrutiny to
property clause legislation which in some manner infringed on a fundamental right. See supra note
190.
230. According to the political question doctrine certain issues are essentially political in nature
and best resolved by the "body politic" rather than the judiciary. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG,
supra note 147, at 109.
231. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2779.
232. See supra notes 190-200 and accompanying text.
233. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
234. Id. at 217.
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tion in other contexts, but it would also reflect the Court's respect for
Congress' ability to craft politically balanced responses in its exercise of
the unique powers inherent in the property clause.3 5
V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined a public land law issue of first impression:
whether the legislative veto provision contained in section 204(e) of
FLPMA is exempt from the strictures for legislation set forth by the
Supreme Court in Chadha. The issue presents a "hard case," with no easy
answer. But by examining the rich historical underpinnings of the property
clause, and by tracing the Supreme Court's construction of the property
clause power in a number of contexts, this article has discerned that a
viable argument exists in support of the provision.
235. According to Professor Tribe, in making the determination of whether to invoke the
political question doctrine:
[A] court must first of all construe the relevant constitutional text, and seek to identify the
purposes the particular provision serves within the constitutional scheme as a whole. At this
stage of the analysis, the court would find particularly relevant the fact that the
constitutional provision by its terms grants authority to another branch of government; if the
provision recognizes such authority, the court will have to consider the possibility of
conflicting conclusions, and the actual necessity for parallel judicial and political remedies.
But ultimately, the political question inquiry turns as much on the court's conception of
judicial competence as on the constitutional text.
TRIBE, supra note 70, at 79.
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